

CHAPTER XI

THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The Survey Group has been primarily concerned with examining the structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the examination of the Service intelligence agencies, emphasis has been placed on their contribution to national intelligence and their relation to the Central Intelligence Agency. On the basis of this study, the Survey Group does not consider itself qualified to submit recommendations regarding either the details of the internal administration of the Services or of their methods of collecting information and producing intelligence.

MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The National Security Act, in providing for the systematic coordination of intelligence, also safeguarded the role of the Services in intelligence by providing in Section 102 (d) (3) that "the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence." Subsequently, the National Security Council in Intelligence Directive No. 3 (See Annex No. 9) defined departmental intelligence as "that intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of the Federal Covernment, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."

The mission of the military services in olves the enormous responsibility of reinteining the security of the United States. It is incumbent upon them the column or obtain from other agencies the intelligence necessary to assist in fulfilling this mission. In the past this need for intelligence has been not to a large extent by the Services acting independently and without

139

the benefit of systematic coordination. Although it is now generally recognized that such coordination is urgently needed, there is still a tendency on the part of the Services to strive to create their own self-contained systems of intelligence.


This tendercy stems in part from the military doctrine that "intelligence is a function of contend," a doctrine which has been interpreted to require the control of the collection and production of all necessary intelligence by the staff of the commender requiring it. The doctrine so construed can only result in an obviously unsatisfactory and impractical attempt at self-sufficiency. As a matter of fact, at all staff levels intelligence must be supplemented by contributions of both raw information and finished intelligence from other departments and agencies.

The general definition of departmental intelligence must therefore be qualified by practical limitations and subject to the overriding necessity for coordination of the intelligence activities of all Government agencies, pursuant to the National Security Act. The need for limiting the tendency toward self-sufficiency, while acknowledging the broad interests of the departments, is formally recognized in National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 2 and 3. These directives assign to the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, respectively, dominant interest in the collection and production of military, naval and air intelligence. The directives also recognize that the concern of the Services in intelligence is broader than their specific areas of dominant interest. Directive No. 2, concerning intelligence collection provides.

140







"No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all Departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to their Departments of all intelligence information pertinent to their Departmental missions."

Similar safeguards are included in Directive No. 3 concerning intelligence production which provides that:

"Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own Department shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the Departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to each of the Departments."

In practice, the Service departments, while concentrating on their respective areas of dominant interest, collect and produce substantial quantities of information in fields with which they are not primarily concerned. As a result, there is considerable duplication in the material collected and produced by them and by other agencies.

COORDINATION OF SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence collection by the Services is an important part of our intelligence system. There are, for example, the intelligence components of overseas contains in Europe and the Far East, and attaches stationed with United States 41, leantic rosts throughout the world who are in a position through observations and official limited to collect valuable information. There are also willtry missions in various countries and specialized representatives such as the Air Technical United Officers abroad and the London office of the Office of Mayal Research. The Services are also the exclusive collectors of communitations intelligence. All of these channels are used to meet the collection




142

requirements of the Services as broadly interpreted by them, as well as some of the collection requirements of other departments and agencies which make use of Service collection facilities.

Some duplication and overlap is inherent in the existence of several independent Service collection agencies operating in all parts of the world. As pointed out in Chapter IV, there has been no continuing coordination of their efforts. The only formal limitations which have been imposed by directives generally prohibit certain methods of intelligence collection, such as espiorage and the routtoring of foreign broadcasts, which have been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as services of common concern. More effective coordination of collection is a recognized necessity and should be performed in accordance with the recommendations outlined in Chapter IV. In addition, coordination can be improved within the Services either upon their own initiative or upon that of the Secretary of Defense.

The production of intelligence by the Service agencies generally falls into the three categories of current, basic and staff intelligence (including estimates).

Current intelligence is prepared by each of the Services in the form of daily, weekly or monthly summeries, briefings and digests derived from varied sources. Much of this product, perticularly that dealing with general military and political developments, is duplicative and of such common interest that some consolidation of effort is desirable and should be possible. We recommend that this situation be reviewed in order to determine what effort may be properly dispensed with, what consolidation is possible, and what common services the Central Intelligence Agency might render in this regard. (See Chapter VI).



In addition to basic studies in their respective fields of dominant interest, including such tasks as determining the armsment potential and order of battle of various countries, each Service accomplishes a large amount of research, compilation of data and reporting in the fields of economic, scientific and political intelligence with which they all have some concern. In our examination of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, we have found that there is overlapping of interest and duplication of effort in intelligence research and production in such fields as petroleum resources, communications, industrial production, guided missiles and biological warfare. Established procedures for coordination in these and related subjects are lacking.

It is in order to improve this situation that we have recommended in Chapter VI the creation, within the Central Intelligence Agency, of a Research and Reports Division which would perform research and production of intelligence in fields of common concern on behalf of all of the interested agencies, and would coordinate their efforts in these fields when centralization was undesirable. This office, which should operate in close relationship with the Carvices and be staffed in part with Service personnel, should perform much of the work now being done in the fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence. There will, of course, be specialized matters for which the inlimitable Services must continue to be ultimately responsible, but there is a vist area of common interest from which they can all draw.

Chiefs of Staff, are the most important type of staff intelligence pro-

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
is not satisfactory. Each Service produces its estimates in accordance with assumptions, standards and methods of its own selection, and gives to them the scope it desires, not necessarily limiting them to its own field of interest. Departmental plans and policies may be based on such independently produced estimates, regardless of the divergent and even contradictory estimates of other departments.

As pointed out in Chapter V, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as yet adequately exercised its function to coordinate these and other estimates, for example those of the State Department, for the purpose of preparing national estimates. The Joint Intelligence Committee performs this task to some extent in the military sphere, but arrangements are lacking for regularly insuring that assumptions are comparable, analytical methods valid, and the final estimates as sound as possible. In our opinion, an important step toward improving this situation would be taken if the recommendations submitted in Chapter V regarding the production of national estimates were adopted.

These steps, together with the creation of the Research and Reports Division in areas of common interest, would have the effect of bolstering the Joint Intelligence Committee in its special role and promoting the coordination of Service estimates in both broad and limited fields. It is important that the strictly military estimates of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the national estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, partly on basis of the same material, should be in harmony.

In the general field of counter-intelligence, the Services have usually placed primary emphasis on protective security activities which do not necessarily have intelligence as their primary aim and have often been performed by

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non-intelligence personnel.* The more specialized counter-espionage function, which has as its precise objective the identification and thwarting of the personnel, methods and aims of unfriendly foreign intelligence services, is a true secret intelligence activity. Exclusive responsibility for its conduct abroad has been properly assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, except for the counter-intelligence activities of the Services necessary for their own security. (See Chapter VIII). In the areas of United States military occupation, this exception has been broadly interpreted and, in particular, the Counter Intelligence Corps, both in Germany and Japan, has devoted considerable effort to counter-espionage, including the use of intelligence networks extending beyond the actual areas of occupation.

There has not been adequate recognition of the need for coordination of these activities with the broader responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The dissipation of trained personnel, failure to centralize information concerning counter-intelligence targets, the risks inherent in the uncoordinated conduct of agent operations, all tend to weaken our prospects of success in counter-espionage.

This need for coordination of the counter-intelligence effort also exists in the United States where the responsibilities of the Cervices are limited in relation to those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.**

- * The Air Force has recognized this exphasis by transferring practically all exphasis-intelligence functions from the Director of Air Intelligence to the fourter-description.
- **Coordination in this field is carried out in accordance with the Presidential Manorandum of June 26, 1939, which stippleted that the War Department, Navy Distribution and Federal Burdau of Investigation would be the only agencies of a Community to conduct investigations into interest involving espionage, in Presidence, or sabelage. The grincipal function of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference set up as a result of this memorandum has been in Substitute the respective investigative responsibilities of the three agencies in the United States.

145



We have seen that within the Military Establishment there is no general machinery for intelligence coordination. The Secretary of Defense at present has no staff for this purpose or to do more than exercise very general supervision and control. He is able to initiate particular projects for coordination and has, in fact, done so with respect to the production of communications intelligence end the attache systems. He can also resolve particular controversies which cannot be settled at a lower level in the Military Establishment. Other examples within the Military Establishment of coordination in limited fields are the Joint Intelligence Committee's responsibility for estimates required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrangements for the production of communications intelligence, and the existence of the Air Intelligence Division for the production of air intelligence by the Air Force and Navy.

Although coordination has been attempted or accomplished by the Services, either on their own initiative or at the instigation of the Secretary of Defense, in limited areas such as those mentioned above, effective coordination of the Service intelligence agencies requires the over-all coordination of the activities of all intelligence agencies in the Government. This is a duty assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee. In Chapter IV we have recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on which the Services are represented, should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities. To a very considerable extent, responsibility for the successful operation of this machinery rests with the Services.

Recognition of the important role of intelligence in the determination of national policy and of the major responsibility which the Services have in



intelligence requires that the Service agencies enjoy in their departments a position comparable to the size of the task assigned to them. In order to be able to carry out their responsibilities to their departments and to make an effective contribution toward a coordinated national intelligence system, the Service agencies must work closely with the planning and operational staffs and be fully informed regarding departmental plans and policies.

To meet adequately their vital responsibilities and to maintain their proper position in the departmental structure, the Service intelligence agencies must be staffed with qualified personnel. This was too little recognized prior to the last war, and upon the outbreak of hostilities we found that we were seriously deficient in numbers and quality of intelligence officers. We did attempt to take steps to correct this situation in the various intelligence schools and by acquiring personnel from civilian life to be trained as intelligence officers. Recently, the importance of intelligence training has been more fully realized, and the Services have taken steps to provide adequate schools. In consequence, the quality of both the intelligence officers and the attaches has improved in recent years.

The theory of rotation in the Services has been a handicap to sound intelligence work in that it militates against experience and continuity. An assignment to intelligence will probably last not more than four years, and welly a charter time. This not only means that the individual officer has liftly lity in becoming proficient in intelligence, but that the Service intelligence agency is in danger of suffering from a lack of continuity of leader-time in intelligence. For example, the Army Intelligence Division has the Chiefs in never years, and the recently formed Directorate of Intelligence, Air Force, has already had two directors.

147

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It is not our purpose to suggest once more the often discussed possibility of an intelligence corps, but we do believe that, if the corps theory is unacceptable, some alternative method should be developed whereby officers, although taking an occasional tour of duty in command, operations or other staff positions, will feel that intelligence is their permanent interest and concentrate in it over the rajor portion of their careers.

In the past, capable officers have not been attracted to intelligence work due to their belief that intelligence was a backwater, might delay promotion, and in any event would not further their careers. This tendency must be overcome and officers made to feel that their opportunities for advancement will not be impaired by an assignment to intelligence duty. Intelligence must be given prestige, and it must be made sufficiently attractive so that an officer will seek an intelligence assignment as he would one to command or operations.

In addition to reking a career in intelligence more attractive in the Services, it is important to provide for the training and availability of reserve officers. There are thousands of such officers today who, during the last war, were in various intelligence agencies or at overseas commands, and many proved of inestimable value. Their talents and their willingness to serve must not be lost.

In conclusion, we wish to note that a measure of progress has been made in that the Service intelligence agencies have manifested an increased interest in intelligence and an attitude conducive to accomplishing its effective coordination. The Services are conscious of their grave responsibility for helping to avert the danger of a national military catastrophe, created by modern methods of warfare. They have come to recognize the need for effective



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
coordination to the end that the intelligence upon which the national policymakers must act shall be the very best obtainable from every available source.
This tendency on their part is in marked and encouraging contrast to the situation which prevailed not only immediately prior to our entry into World War II,
but even in the early days of that conflict itself. We believe that, given
effective leadership, the full cooperation of the Service agencies in the
achievement of genuine coordination can be obtained.

CONCILISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The Service intelligence agencies have manifested an increased interest in intelligence and an attitude conducive to accomplishing its effective coordination.
- (2) In order to meet adequately their vital responsibilities and maintain their proper position in the departmental structure, the Service intelligence agencies should be staffed with qualified personnel who concentrate in intelligence over the rajor portion of their careers.
- (3) In accordance with a program of coordination initiated and guided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service intelligence agencies should contine the selves principally to those fields of intelligence in which they have the principal interest.
- (4) A none active program of coordination by the Central Intelligence ignay would result in a higher degree of centralization and coordination of intelligence production in fields where the Services have a common interest.
- (5) There should be effective coordination between the work of the Joint Latelligence Co. dittee in the field of military estimates and that of the Control Latelligence Agency and Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field of antical estimates.

149

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CHAPTER XII

THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department is assigned dominant interest in the collection and production of political, cultural, and sociological intelligence by the National Security Council. It necessarily follows from this allocation that it is the sgency to which the Central Intelligence Agency and the military services should turn to secure the reports and estimates they may require in these fields of intelligence.

Possibly we can best explain our ideas of the State Department's role by a concrete but hypothetical illustration. We shall assume, for example, that the Secretary of the Navy, to prepare himself to meet his responsibilities in connection with a visit of maral units to the vestern Mediterranean, desires a report on political conditions in Spain. To secure it, he would turn to his Chief of Naval Intelligence. The latter in turn should sook the desired information from the State Department, either directly or through the Central Intelligence Agency. He should not try to get it from his own intelligence analysts, any more than he would expect the State Department to furnish from its own resources an estimate of the strength of the Spanish Navy. The reason is obvious. The State Department is the main repository of political information about Spain. It is also the final arbiter of our attitude with respect to Spain. For the Navy, our policy in this situation is a fact, and a vital fact, to be taken into account.

If, to take enother hypothetical case, the National Security Council felt the most for an over-all estimate of the Spenish situation -- an estimate that would include not only political information from the State Department but


151

military and strategic elements as well -- then, as indicated more fully in Chapter V, a national estimate should be prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for review and approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Here would be brought together the intelligence resources of State, of the military services, of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of any other agency equipped to rake a real contribution on the subject. The State Department representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee would, of course, share in the responsibility for the final estimate.

Because of the intelligence contribution which the State Department should be prepared to make to the National Security Council and to other Government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department is called upon to assume an important role in the field of intelligence, even apart from its task of supplying the information required by its own policy officers. We have examined the intelligence functions of the State Department, and particularly the intelligence organization of the Department, known as the Research Intelligence staff, solely to determine how effectively the State Department is organized to meet these outside intelligence requirements, particularly those of the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE STAFF

The Research and Intelligence staff is unique among the departmental intelligence agencies for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is an intelligence agency within an intelligence agency, since the collection and interpretation of all information bearing on our foreign relations is a primary objective of the Department as a whole and of its officers in the field. In the second place, the Research and Intelligence staff was not established by



the Department in response to keenly felt internal needs. It was the result of the transfer to the Department in 1945, of the Research and Analysis and the Presentations Branches of the Office of Strategic Services.

At the head of the Research and Intelligence staff is a Special Assistant to the Secretary. The staff is divided into three units: the Office of the Special Assistant, comprising several personal assistants and a rather substantial unit conducting research in special source material; an Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition, and an Office of Intelligence Research which is the intelligence producing branch of the organization.

The research analysts in the Office of Intelligence Research are for the most part persons of academic background, and many of them are of high quality. In general, however, the recruitment of first-rate intelligence analysts and other specialists has become increasingly difficult as the future of the Research and Intelligence staff became more and more uncertain.

The functions of the Research and Intelligence staff, as officially defined, are to develop and implement a "comprehensive and coordinated intelligence program for the United States;" and to develop and implement a similar coordinated program for "positive foreign intelligence" for the Department, including procurement of information and the production of intelligence studies of applications. In addition, Research and Intelligence is authorized instructions to Department officers abroad and to determine what information flowing into the Department is required for the production of the Variable are."


This definition of functions and responsibilities does not indicate the



particular kind of "program for positive foreign intelligence" which Research and Intelligence will develop. In particular, it does not clearly distinguish between fectual studies and intelligence estimates, and it does not give the staff any special authority or responsibility in producing intelligence, such at the intelligence agencies of the military services enjoy in their respective departments. The charter is broad and vegue, and invites a variety of interpretations.

The intelligence reports which Research and Intelligence prepares and circulates within the Department are of several different kinds. They include intelligence memorands, which comprise a brief analysis of information on current subjects; information notes, which are factual reports involving little interpretation or estimating; Office of Intelligence Research studies, which are exhauntive summaries of available information on subjects of particular significance; periodical reports, which are confined to factual reporting on subjects of continuing interest; and situation reports, which comprise reviews of the political, economic and social situations in foreign countries.

With the exception of situation and periodical reports, the studies of the Office of Intelligence Research are prepared, at least in theory, at the request of policy or other officers of the department. Actually, many of them are written on the initiative of the Office itself. A majority are in principle requested by other offices in the Department, but generally result from proposals which the Office of Intelligence Research has made and which have elicited an indication of interest which can serve as a "request." The situation reports have ordinarily not been prepared in response to requests, but are now integrated with the National Intelligence Survey program (see Chapter VI) in which Research and Intelligence is extensively participating.



The quality of these different reports varies greatly. The main criticisms of them are that they tend to be academic, are unrelated to immediate policy problems, and are often too lengthy and detailed to influence busy policy officers. It has been observed that Research and Intelligence produces "Ph.D. intelligence," scholastically admirable, but of schowhat limited use in the day-to-day formulation of policy.

The Policy Planning Staff and the political (geographical) desks and economic affairs offices of the Department are the principal recipients and users of such reports. As indicated earlier, these offices request a relatively limited number of reports on their own initiative, and for the most part do not consider them essential to their work.

It is open to question whether Research and Intelligence occupies a position in the State Department which permits it to play an effective and necessary role in the over-all intelligence picture of the Government. As we have strated, Research and Intelligence was, in effect, grafted upon the existing organization of the Department. There was no large body of opinion within the Department or the Foreign Service which keenly supported the contributions which in intelligence staff could take to policy decisions. In fact there was substantial feeling that the functions called "intelligence" were at least retailed to, if not inclusive of, rany of those already performed by the policy offices. For these reasons why replace of the Department were originally reluctant to make use of the physically separate intelligence staff.

This shootness is confirmed by the failure to bring the intelligence or'...' A into it of that rolley councils. In view of the special nature of
'No Department's work, throughout which intelligence and policy are closely

155

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
joined, this is understandable. In any event, the effect is to establish the intelligence staff not at the sole source of intelligence analysis, but merely as one possible source which could be employed if the policy authorities so desired. The intelligence staff, in the opinion of many policy officers, has not seemed to offer the Department any uniquely significant contributions which would justify its regular and intensive employment.

The precise function of Research and Intelligence in producing intelligence reports has rever been adequately defined. It has not been rade clear whether Research and Intelligence should limit its activities to preparing exclusively factual studies at the request of policy officers, or should produce intelligence estimates.

Whatever the designed scope of its functions, Research and Intelligence has noted increasingly during the past year in the direction of intelligence estimating. In this respect it has sought to assume a responsibility long accepted by the other departmental intelligence agencies. But its movement in this direction has brought it into conflict with the policy officers of its own Department who consider it their own function to be the analysts of current problems as well as the formulators of our policies.

Accordingly, Research and Intelligence enters the field of the policy officers when it presents estimates of its own, which appear to analyze the policy implications of a given problem. The conflict over this aspect of the Research and Intelligence role is most evident in regard to intelligence memoranda prepared by the organization on more or less current developments. Although such reports may represent a high degree of analytic skill, they are likely to be regarded by the policy officer as a useless repetition of 156

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information with which he is already familiar, or an unwarranted attempt to tell him what he should think about a problem under his consideration.

Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Department's attitude toward the Research and Intelligence reports is the line which appears in the printed heading of each: "The conclusions expressed herein are based upon research and analysis by the Intelligence Organization, and do not necessarily represent the views of other offices of the Department of State."

If, in fact, Research and Intelligence does prepare estimates, there is the possibility that on certain matters two or more separate studies or estimates covering the same subject may exist simultaneously in the Department. The Policy Planning Staff or the geographical desks, for example, are accusteded to draft their own estimates quite independently of Research and Intelligence. Yet Research and Intelligence, knowing that a particular matter is one of general concern to policy officials, may prepare an estimate of its own. To long as these remain in the State Department no direct harm may result, although the duplication of effort and the existence of unreconciled points of view on the same subject may be undesirable. If, however, as may well occur, the contrate estimates are used outside the Department in satisfying the needs of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Centralog, the possibility of confusion is obvious.

AND ELECTION WHITE ENTWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OUTSIDE AGENCIES

In the future -- particularly if action is taken on our recommendations for the elimination of much of the miscellaneous political intelligence work whose outside of the State Department -- the latter will be called upon more and more to make intelligence contributions to the Services, to the




Central Intelligence Agency and to national intelligence estimates. will be doubly important that the responsibility for the State Department's contribution be more clearly fixed within the Department.

One possible solution might be to limit the Research and Intelligence staff to factual reporting and to place on the policy officers of the Department the responsibility for passing upon any political intelligence estimates used outside of the Department. Alternatively these estimates might be prepared by Research and Intelligence and then passed upon by the appropriate policy officers of the Department before they go to the Central Intelligence Agency or to other Government departments. A third solution might be to allocate the personnel of Research and Intelligence emong the policy offices (geographical deska) of the Department or attach then to the Policy Planning Staff and then place on the policy officers or Planning Staff the responsibility for State Department estimates for the Central Intelligence Agency or for other outside Government agencies.

The State Department should, of course, be protected from burdensome and unreasonable demands for political estimates from other agencies. If such call should create a problem, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on which the Department will be represented, should exercise its occordinating function to reduce the demands to manageable proportions.

Furthermore, the Department has a primary responsibility to exercise 1ts intelligence functions for the purpose of formulating its own policies. It must adopt the methods and techniques which will best meet this primary responsibility. How this is done is not within our competence. However, in working out its own internal procedure, it is important to the over-all intelligence 158





set-up and particularly to the proper functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency, with which this report is immediately concerned, that the State Department should equip itself to meet the legitimate request for political intelligence submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency or other Covernment intelligence agencies and to effect the closer liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency which we have recommended in this report.

To meet these requirements we recommend that the State Department give consideration to assigning to some senior officer of the Department the functions of Intelligence Officer.* Such officer should have the prestige, the authority, and the access to operational and policy matters which would equip him to guide the production and control the dissemination of State Department intelligence estimates. The Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence and his staff do not today have such powers or position. Whether, in a given case, the intelligence estimates would emanate from the Policy Planning Staff, the political offices (geographical desks), or from a combination of the two, plus the Research and Intelligence staff, is a matter for internal State Department determination.

The appointment of an Intelligence Officer, with the powers and functions we have indicated, and with a small but highly trained staff, in our opinion, would result in a more efficient system whereby the Department could must any is distincte music of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other Government municies for political intelligence. In this way the Department could also offect closer limits with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service

159



have used the term "Intelligence Officer" here for reasons of clarity rely. As a practical matter and for security reasons some other and more innocuous title would be desirable.

This Intelligence Officer would serve as the Department's representative on the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Cornittee, described in He would also act as the Department's principal lisison officer for other metters concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, including lisison with the Office of Policy Coordination as provided by the National Security Council and with other covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency as This Intelligence Officer would combine the funcsurgested in this report. tions now being hamiled by several departmental officers or not being handled He should not, however, stand between other department officers and the appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, but he should For example, the various desks in the opercoordinate these relationships. ating and estimating units of the Central Intelligence Agency should develop close working relationships with the corresponding geographical desks or other policy officers of the Department.

We recognize that in recommending that the political intelligence reports and estimates be passed upon by the policy officers of the Department, there is the risk, which we discussed above in the chapter on national estimates, that these reports will be colored, possibly even distorted, by the policy prejudices of those who prepare them. As between this danger and that of having the reports propered by a group which is not thoroughly acquainted with the operational and policy decisions of the Department, we choose the former. We do so in the hope that if the Central Intelligence Agency, and particularly its Estimates Division, and the Intelligence Advisory Committee function as we believe they should, an opportunity will be afforded to challenge departmental estimates and to appraise them in the light of reports available to members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee from other sources. (See Chapter V). Here



it may be possible to correct estimates of any single department that have gone "overboard" for a particular policy line which from a broader view of available facts may be shown to be unsound.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The State Department, to which the National Security Council has assigned dominant interest in the collection and production of political, cultural and sociological intelligence, should equip itself more adequately to meet the legitimate requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other Government intelligence agencies for such intelligence.
- (2) The specialized intelligence staff in the State Department, the Research and Intelligence staff, does not now have sufficient current knowledge of departmental operations and policies to furnish, on behalf of the Department, the basic estimates which may be required by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pervice intelligence agencies.
- (3) The ligison between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency should be closer and put on a continuing, effective basis.
- (4) To most the foregoing requirements, consideration should be given by the Department to designating a high officer of the Department, who has full access tooperational and policy matters, to act as intelligence officer. This store, with a small staff, should process requests for departmental intelligence received from the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies and see that legitimate requests are not through the proparation of the requisite intelligence reports or estimates by the appropriate departmental efficars. He should also act as continuing Intelligence limited officer with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service intelligence agencies.

161

